Blake Deal: Discussing extremism requires separating doctrine from its adherents

In the midst of bombings, suffering and tragedy, there are still people squabbling over whether or not “Islamic terrorism” is a valid phrase. Given a moment’s thought, it should not be so controversial.

The attack in Brussels on March 22, which left dozens dead and hundreds wounded, is one of the most recent terrorist attacks the Islamic State has claimed responsibility for. The attack on Brussels’ airport and subway system comes just months after the Paris terrorist attacks back in November, also perpetrated by the Islamic State. These attacks, like the countless ones that have come before, force us to consider the relation between ideology and human action.

There are usually two main interpretations of the role of Islam in these kinds of events: One side asserts Islam is a religion of violence and therefore produces violent adherents, while those on the other side are quick to counter that Islam is a religion of peace, saying that to claim otherwise is hateful toward Muslim people.

This conflict is avoidable. It is possible to speak of “Islamic terrorism” without making claims about all professing Muslims or Islamic doctrine. What both sides fail to take into account is the distinction between an ideology’s doctrine and the actions of its professing adherents. Referring to acts as Islamic terrorism, Christian terrorism or Communist terrorism are all valid phrases used to describe a significant trend among individuals, in the past or present, who claim to commit acts of terror in obedience to their interpretation of their belief systems.

All ideologies can be interpreted in at least two ways: doctrinally and politically. To interpret an ideology doctrinally involves judging it according to the teachings of its authoritative texts, while judging an ideology politically involves judging it according to the actions of its self-professed adherents.

We ought to primarily interpret terrorist attacks through a political lens and not a doctrinal lens. Discovering the supposedly “true” interpretation of an ideology is unnecessary when judging a person’s motivation for committing acts of terror. We do not need to have an infallible interpretation of Islam to know that some people interpret it in such a way that leads them to bomb airports. Based on this distinction it does not matter whether an ideology is doctrinally peaceful or violent. Ideological doctrine may be interesting in its own right, but has far less relevance when trying to prevent future attacks.

Failing to consider human actions apart from true doctrine is why both sides often incorrectly interpret ideologically-motivated actions.

One side rushes to defend the integrity of an ideology and its adherents at the expense of acknowledging the role that belief system plays in motivating human actions. For example, David Cameron, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, stated that terrorist attacks committed on June 26 of last year were not committed in the name of Islam. This is nonsense. Of course they were, but recognizing these actions were motivated by a particular interpretation of Islam says nothing about what the “true” version of Islam is.

The other side blames ideology at the expense of acknowledging the complexity of human experience and beliefs. CBS News reported that hostility toward professing Muslims and Islamic religious centers increased immediately following the Paris attacks in November in the United States and Canada. These violent threats ignore the fact that, regardless of the “true” interpretation of Islam, professing Muslims cannot be placed in any single homogenous category of action or belief, but rather come in many varieties.

The same standard goes for morally permissible actions. If there is a significant amount of people performing acts of charity because of their interpretation of one of these belief systems, then it would be Islamic, Christian or Communist charity. This applies to all belief systems, religious or otherwise.

Recognizing that ideologies like these have many different interpretations does not mean all are equally valid or lead to the same outcomes. What it enables us to do is to recognize certain bad actions and certain good actions as being ideologically motivated without having to worry about alienating others of the same ideology who may disagree. It allows us to identify social subgroups within a general belief system without forcing us to make doctrinal claims about that belief system.

The complex interrelation between ideological ideals and human actions ought to be recognized as those affected by the attacks in Brussels slowly recover from this terrible event.