Members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission expressed dissatisfaction after the Government Accountability Office released an audit report claiming that the commission has underestimated the risk of terrorist attacks on its licensed nuclear research reactors.
The report said research reactors, though less powerful than commercial nuclear reactors, may be targeted by terrorists who could use the reactors’ fuel to create nuclear weapons or disperse radioactive materials.
The GAO report pointed out that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s security measures are largely based on regulations it had in place before Sept. 11 and places doubt on the commission’s assessments in reflecting the full range of security risks and potential consequences of attacks on research reactors. It recommends that the commission reassess the security of its licensed research reactors.
There are 37 research reactors in the U.S., 27 of which are located on university campuses. UC Davis and UC Irvine are the two UC campuses which have a research reactor.
Members of the NRC said they are not pleased with the message of the report. In a letter addressed to the director of the GAO, the commission launched a series of complaints about what they described as the report’s unbalanced assessment of the commission’s effort to enhance security after Sept. 11,
In the letter, the commission said that much of the report hinges on a sample document prepared by Idaho National Laboratory which did not receive credible technical review. The commission also said the report lacks a sound technical basis or credible intelligence information in support of its recommendations.
Eliot Brenner, director of Public Affairs for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said the report’s credibility is questionable at best.
“It is unbalanced, misrepresents and excludes facts, and fails to acknowledge experts who disagree,” Brenner said.
Brenner emphasizes that the NRC takes security of all nuclear material very seriously, whether a power reactor or research reactor.
“The security for each research reactor is customized on the threat and on the risk. If we sense a change of threat, we would not hesitate to order increased security for the research reactor,” Brenner said.
He said that both the NRC and the labs have made it clear that they are not happy with the report. He called the GAO “fallible.”
“In this case they fail and they know it,” Brenner said. “This is a poor effort and they ought to be embarrassed.”
While UC Irvine also has a research reactor on its campus, George Miller, the UCI nuclear reactor facility director, said the school has enforced sufficient security measures around its reactor.
“We are fully compliant to the NRC’s rules … and we believe it’s a sensible assessment at this time,” Miller said.
Miller said he believed that the commission has properly assessed the risk situation.
He maintained that his department has substantially raised security measures in the last 10 years as well as after Sept. 11.
“We see this as a battle between GAO and NRC over whose experts make most sense,” Miller said.
David Rapoport, professor emeritus of political science, said terrorists would rarely target nuclear materials.
He said terrorists tend to target places where there are crowds and access is easy, such as a stadium during a football game, an airport or landmarks. They also tend to go for the simplest kind of weapon for maximum mobility.
“It seems that this argument (of the audit report) is largely based on some evidence that terrorists have increased their interest in capacity in gaining access to nuclear materials,” Rapoport said. “Most people who know anything about terrorist activities would not agree with that. It’s not the sort of weapons they normally use or concern (themselves) with.”
Bethany Lyles, a nuclear engineering postdoctoral scholar at UC Berkeley, also said she did not see a high possibility of a terrorist attack on nuclear reactors on university campuses.
“The biggest risk would be someone who has access to the reactor to try to convert the material to useful material,” Lyles said. “It has to be someone who has access, knows what he’s doing. … This has to be a sophisticated inside job.”
She said while it is possible that terrorists could receive such sophisticated training, she did not think it would be easy for them to enter a lab and convert the material without people noticing since the process is very complex and requires advanced equipment.
Rapoport said it is hard to tell whether the audit report’s warning is valid. He said he attributes any anxiety to what he feels is the government’s excessive concern with weapons of mass destruction.
“Sept. 11 is the result of our obsession with weapons of mass destruction,” he said, saying that the government overlooked other terrorist methods, such as hi-jacking airplanes.
“Before Sept. 11 we were obsessed with the fact that the attack that would occur would be to do with WMD. In all the conferences in Washington, that’s all they talk about.”